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Introduction
Despite being a multi-billion dollar industry 1 , European soccer has witnessed serious refereeing errors. 2 As technology has advanced, soccer fans have grown intolerant of I thank Karl Wärneryd (supervisor) and Huseyin Yildirim for their helpful comments. All errors are mine. 1 According to Deloitte Consulting, in the midst of economic pressures, the European soccer market reached $24.6 billion in revenue terms in 2012, which implies 11% growth in 2011/12. More details can be found at <http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_LB/ly/press/pressreleases/4c11cefd2e23f310VgnVCM3000003456f70aRCRD.htm#> 2 Perhaps, the most memorable ones are England's second goal against Germany in the 1966 World Cup Final, Argentina's …rst goal against England in the 1986 World Cup, and England's second goal against Germany in the 2010 World Cup. 1 these errors. Yet, European soccer leagues, and the international organizations such as UEFA and FIFA, seem reluctant to introduce any advanced technology that can minimize refereeing errors at a reasonable cost and with little disruption to the games.
It is only in 2013 that several major soccer leagues, including the English and Dutch, have decided to adopt a goal-line technology while others including the Spanish and German have agreed to follow suit in the near future. In contrast to team-based European soccer, technology adoption appears timely in individualistic sports like tennis, athletics, horse-racing, etc. The objective of this paper is to o¤er a political theory for this discrepancy. Speci…cally, we examine players' incentives to support a new technology that improves contest accuracy. We show that these incentives may substantially di¤er from those of a contest designer because conceivably, players care more about winning than increasing the aggregate e¤ort. Therefore, in contests where players retain a signi…cant say in contest design, technology adoption may be delayed. Indeed, the English Premier League only recently adopted the new goal-line technology after votes from its twenty clubs. 3 The same may be true for other contests where accuracy improvement is feasible.
Today, some educational institutions use plus/minus grading instead of letter grading, where the former better di¤erentiates students and is thus believed to enhance grading accuracy. One rationale for this is the contention that plus/minus grading is superior to letter grading, its less accurate counterpart, in motivating student achievement. While those not using it may have various reasons such as …nancial and administrative costs, one reason could be student resistance. In fact, an ad-hoc committee on plus/minus grading, established by Eastern Kentucky University in 2013, reported that more than half of the universities in Kentucky are still not using plus/minus grading for various reasons, one being student resistance. 4 Likewise, Dixon (2004) …nds that the ratio of students choosing plus/minus grading over those choosing letter grading is 1 to 2, whenever they are given a choice.
Our model is a standard Tullock contest with heterogeneous players. We de…ne contest accuracy as the elasticity of "production"in the Tullock contest success function since higher elasticity implies that winning depends more on the e¤ort than on "exogenous uncertainty". In practice, accuracy can be improved through various mechanisms depending on the context: in sports by allowing referees to get access to a better technology, and in lobbying by providing interest groups with extra information about the preferences of decision-makers. We assume there are two types of players:
those with a high marginal cost and those with a low marginal cost. Following Dixit (1987), we call the former type underdogs and the latter type favorites.
In the unique equilibrium, we …nd that while the underdog's payo¤ is always decreasing in accuracy, the favorite's payo¤ is ambiguous. In particular, when the initial accuracy is very low, the favorite prefers higher accuracy if the cost advantage is signi…cant, and lower accuracy otherwise. This makes sense because when the cost advantage is small, players are essentially identical and therefore compete most Figure 1 , the competitive balance measures the dispersion of wins across teams. Formally, it is the standard deviation of wins. Thus, while 0 implies that the number of wins is the same for all teams, any non-zero number shows the degree of heterogeneity among teams' number of wins with respect to the mean number of wins. More details can be found at <http://www.soccerbythenumbers.com/2011/06/comparing-competitiveness-of-european.html> Related Literature:
Our paper falls into a large collection of literature on contest design. These include: the choice of prizes (Glazer and Hassin (1988) , Moldovanu and Sela (2001) ), the choice of contest success function (Dasgupta and Nti (1998) , Nti (2004) ), the number of contestants (Baye et al. (1993) , Amegashi (1999)), the structure of multi-stage contests (Gradstein (1998) , Gradstein and Konrad (1999) , Amegashie (2000) , Yildirim (2005)), and the structure of information (Wärneryd (2003 (Wärneryd ( ,2012 ). 6 This literature is mainly concerned about contest design aimed at maximizing total e¤ort. 7 More importantly, the contest designer is treated as independent in the design process.
That is, only the designer's preferences matter for the contest design. In contrast, our focus is on the players'preferences for the contest design.
In highlighting accuracy di¤erences across contests, our paper relates to Alcalde and Dahm (2007), Che and Gale (1997), Dasgupta and Nti (1998) , Micheals (1988), Nti (1999 Nti ( ,2004 , Wang (2010) . In these models, the contest designer employs accuracy, the extent to which winning depends on e¤ort rather than exogenous uncertainty, to adjust these incentives. Moreover, they model accuracy as elasticity of production in a standard Tullock contest as in our paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in the next section, followed by the equilibrium characterization in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 provide …ndings regarding players and the designer who is concerned about maximizing total e¤ort respectively. Section 6 discusses the …ndings. Section 7 extends the model to a pairwise contest, and Section 7 concludes.
The Model
The model is a standard Tullock contest. A population of n + m risk-neutral players simultaneously exert e¤ort to win a prize V > 0. The cost of e¤ort for player i is 6 See Nitzan (1994) and Konrad (2009) for a detailed survey of contest literature. 7 If e¤orts are interpreted as rent-seeking, then the design aims to minimize total error.
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C i (x i ) = c i x i where x i 0 denotes his e¤ort and c i 2 fc L ; c H g denotes his marginal cost, where 0 < c L < c H . Let x =(x 1 ; :::; x n ; x n+1 ; :::; x n+m ) represent an e¤ort pro…le such that c i = c L for i = 1; :::; n. Given x, player i's probability of winning or the contest success function (CSF) takes the Tullock form:
where r 2 (0; 1). Clearly, i's probability of winning is increasing with his own e¤ort and decreasing with others', both at a decreasing rate. In particular,
Note that the "production function"f (x i ) = x r i has a constant elasticity, r. That is, as r increases, the probability of winning becomes more sensitive to e¤orts, and less sensitive to exogenous uncertainty. Depending on the context, the source of such effort sensitivity can be technological, political, or institutional. For instance, in sports r may be determined by the resolution of cameras used or by the ability of the referees in deciding close calls. In lobbying, r may be a¤ected by the (unknown) preferences of decision-makers, and in organizations, it may be the result of the allocation of property rights. In general, we will call r the accuracy of the contest, and investigate players' preferences for this accuracy. We begin our analysis by equilibrium characterization.
Equilibrium Characterization
The expected payo¤ of player i can be written:
An e¤ort pro…le x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if player i's e¤ort is a best-reply to others'; namely
i (x 1 ; :::; x i ; :::; x n+m ):
Lemma 1 There is a unique x .
Proof. Directly follows from Szidarovski and Okuguchi (1997).
The argument for the equilibrium existence is routine. The uniqueness relies on the assumption that r < 1 so that there are diminishing marginal returns to e¤ort. Since there are two sets of identical players in our contest, the uniqueness of equilibrium implies that players with equal marginal costs choose equal e¤orts in equilibrium.
The following proposition fully characterizes equilibrium e¤orts and players'payo¤s.
Proof. Part (a) directly follows from (1). Next, di¤erentiating (3) with respect to x i and employing (2), player i's …rst-order condition can be stated as
Note …rst note that x L = x H = 0 cannot form an equilibrium because, given zero e¤ort by others, a player can guarantee winning by an " > 0 e¤ort. In fact, because r < 1, it must be that x H > 0 and x L > 0; otherwise, (5) would be violated for the player with zero e¤ort. Positive equilibrium e¤orts imply that (5) holds with equality for all i. In particular,
Together with the fact that p L > p H from part (a), part (b) is obtained. Inserting (6) into (3) proves part (c). Finally, to show part (d), we divide both sides of (6) to 6 obtain: Proposition 1 is intuitive. It says that the low-cost players work harder and thus they are more likely to win the contest. In the terminology of Dixit (1987) , we therefore call a low-cost player a favorite and a high-cost player an underdog. It also says that all players participate in the competition. This is due to the fact that, for small e¤orts, the marginal bene…t is greater than the marginal cost. Formally, this relies on the assumption that r < 1.
8 Despite exerting more e¤ort and incurring a higher cost, as c L x L c H x H by part (b), Proposition 1 reveals that the favorite is better o¤ than the underdog.
Armed with the equilibrium characterization, we are ready to investigate how players'payo¤s change with the accuracy, r.
Comparative Statics of the Accuracy, r
To establish a benchmark, we begin with the two-player case which is often adopted in the contest literature.
Benchmark: Two Players
Assume that there is one favorite and one underdog. The intuition suggests that the favorite should always prefer higher contest accuracy in order to make his e¤ort -not the exogenous uncertainty -more decisive in winning, while the opposite should hold for the underdog. 9 The following proposition mostly con…rms this intuition.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is one favorite and one underdog, i.e., n = m = 1.
where c 2:09 uniquely solves: 2c ln c c 1 = 0, and e 2:71 is the natural number.
Proof. Note that p L + p H = 1 for n = m = 1. Together with (6), this implies
More simply,
by part (a) implies @ @r = 0: Now, calculating the derivative using Proposition 1c provides
which together with c > 1 yields
< 0 for all r, as desired.
Finally, to prove part (c), we di¤erentiate L with respect to r to obtain
where @f (r; c) @c
and
Clearly, if c e, then since f (r; e) < 0 and @f (r;c) @c < 0 for any r, we have f (r; c) < 0 which, in turn, implies f (r; c) > 0 whenever c < c, and f (r; c) > 0 whenever c < c < e and r < r; and f (r; c) < 0 whenever c < c < e and r > r. Combining our …ndings shows part (c).
Part (a) is well-known in the literature on Tullock contests (e.g., Nitzan (1994 and it increases if the initial level is high. Although prominently used in the literature, the two-player case is restrictive in our investigation because discussion about the contest accuracy often involves more than two players, necessitating a more general analysis.
More than Two Players
Suppose that there are at least three players including one favorite and one underdog.
The next proposition shows that the relative e¤ort of the underdog in equilibrium,
, is no longer independent of the accuracy level, r, even though its impact on the underdogs'payo¤ is qualitatively the same as in the two-player case.
Proposition 3 Suppose there are n favorites, and m underdogs. Then, (a)
Proof. Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to r yields,
10 Technically, since, with two players,
Routine algebra yields
Now note from (4) 
. Substituting this into the above expressions, we get:
Clearly, g r < 0 and g < 0 since < 1 by Proposition 1d, proving part (a). To prove part (b), we di¤erentiate H with respect to r (as in the two-player case),
Employing Proposition 1c and 1a, we respectively get,
From here, it follows that
which, together implies,
As a result, we have
To understand Proposition 3, note that in general, an increase in the accuracy level, r, introduces a direct "technological"e¤ect and an indirect "competitive"e¤ect measured by . Part (a) indicates that unlike in the two-player benchmark, superior accuracy creates a competitive advantage for the favorites by motivating them more than the underdogs. Part (b) shows that as the accuracy improves, the technological e¤ect also works against the underdog because, all else equal, the winning becomes more sensitive to e¤ort.
As with the two-player case, the impact of the accuracy on the favorite's payo¤ is ambiguous. This ambiguity is, however, qualitatively di¤erent depending on whether the underdogs or the favorites form the majority in the contest. To ease exposition, we present analytical results for the two extreme values of accuracy and show their robustness through numerical examples later.
Proposition 4 Suppose there are n favorites and m underdogs. Then,
where e c(n; m) 2 (1; n n 1 ) uniquely solves: mc + n + 2mc ln( n (n 1)c mc (m 1) ) = 0.
Moreover, e c(n; m) is decreasing in n and m, each converging to 1.
Proof. Employing Proposition 1c to di¤erentiate L with respect to r provides
where
Di¤erentiating p L with respect to r dp L dr
Routine algebra yields dp
where we have also used (4) to obtain @ @r
. Using (4) to obtain the limit values of
lim r!0 p L and lim r!0 dp L dr can be calculated after substituting (10) into (8) and (9) lim r!0
Likewise, lim
can be calculated after substituting (11) and (12) into (7) lim r!0
which implies lim r!0 d L dr < 0 if and only if c < exp(1 + n 1 m ), proving part (a). To prove part (b), we follow the same steps as in part (a). So, we …rst refer to (4) to obtain
After substituting (13) into (8) and (9), lim r!1 p L and lim r!1 dp L dr are found as
lim r!1 dp
Likewise, after substituting (14) and (15) into (7), lim
Letting,
it can be rewritten as
Obviously, the term in parenthesis is always negative. Hence, we need to examine the sign of f . To this end, we di¤erentiate f with respect to c to …nd
it follows,
which together with the continuity of f (c) over (1; 
which implies ) n] (2e c 2 ) m 2 + ((2n 1) ne c e c 2 (n 1) (n 2) n 2 ) m + n (n (n 1) e c) .
Note that 1 e c < showing that e c(n; m) is decreasing in n and m.
Part (a) of Proposition 4 indicates that when the initial accuracy level is very low, the favorite prefers higher accuracy if his cost advantage is signi…cant. This is in line with the benchmark case where, in a su¢ ciently uneven contest, higher accuracy discourages the underdog, though not to the extent of dropping out of the competition. More interestingly for the case of multiple players, the favorite is more likely to support higher accuracy as more underdogs and/or fewer favorites compete.
This also makes sense because, in either situation, the balance of competition tips to cates that when the cost advantage is small enough, the favorite's payo¤ monotonically decreases with accuracy. An increase in the cost advantage, however, makes this monotonicity disappear. First, the pattern is "decrease-increase-decrease" followed by "increase-decrease" with further increases in the cost advantage. Figure 2 , and the only di¤erence seems to be the smaller cuto¤ values. However, this is not true. Unlike in Figure 2 where the monotonicity is observed for small enough cost advantages, monotonicity is observed for some high cost advantages.
focus of many studies (see Related Literature). 11 So, in what follows, we assume that total e¤ort maximization is the only concern of the designer. The following proposition analyses the impact of higher accuracy on total e¤ort (hereinafter, TE), the designer's only concern.
Proposition 5 Suppose there are n favorites and m underdogs. If the initial accuracy is very low, then total e¤ort increases with accuracy. However, if the initial accuracy is very high, then total e¤ort increases with accuracy unless the cost advantage is moderate, and it decreases otherwise. Formally,
where b c(n; m) 2 (1; 
Proof. Total e¤ort is given by
By taking the common parenthesis of x H and remembering that =
, it can be rewritten as
Recall that x H and p H are given by
by Proposition 1a & 1b respectively. Substituting (17) and (18) into (16), it becomes
Notice that can be rewritten as
by (4) . Substituting (20) into (19) and
Letting
Di¤erentiating T E with respect to r, we obtain
Referring to (4) to obtain the limit values of , we get
Using (24), (23), and (22) together
which implies lim r!0
d(T E) dr
> 0 for all c, showing part (a). Similarly, using (25), (23), and (22) together
As the term in parenthesis is always positive, we will just focus on f . Note that which completes the proof.
Part (a) of Proposition 5 indicates that when the initial accuracy is very low, total e¤ort increases with accuracy independent of the size of the cost advantage. This is in line with the intuition that a decrease in accuracy weakens players'incentives for e¤ort because lower accuracy is associated with lower e¤ort sensitivity of winning.
In the extreme, when accuracy is zero, it becomes a pure lottery in which no players exert any e¤ort.
Part (b) of Proposition 5 indicates that when the cost advantage is either small enough or big enough, total e¤ort increases with accuracy for very high initial accuracy. The intuition behind it is simple. When the cost advantage is either small enough or high enough, the contest essentially takes place among identical players.
Speci…cally, when it is small enough, all players are essentially identical. When it is big enough, however, the competition takes place among favorites for very high initial accuracy. This is because high initial accuracy intensi…es the cost advantage, which is already signi…cant. This discourages underdogs, leading to very low e¤ort provision in the equilibrium by them. Evidently, when competition takes place among identical players, higher accuracy leads to greater total e¤ort. Thus, higher accuracy leads to greater total e¤ort when the initial accuracy is very high and the cost advantage is not moderate.
Up to now, our analysis has yielded conditions under which the players and the designer would want to adopt new technology that improves contest accuracy. Equipped with these conditions, we are ready to highlight the cases in which the con ‡ict of interest arises between the players and the designer.
Proposition 6 Suppose there are n favorites, m underdogs, and let e c(n; m) and b c(n; m) be de…ned as above. Then, regardless of the asymmetry between types, con‡ict over an accuracy improvement arises. The type of con ‡ict, however, depends on initial accuracy, asymmetry, and number of players from each type. Formally,
Proof. Directly follows from Propositions 4 & 5.
Part (a) of Proposition 6 highlights con ‡icts when the initial accuracy is very low. As mentioned earlier, the designer, unlike the underdog who never prefers higher accuracy under any circumstances, always prefers higher accuracy whenever the initial accuracy is very low. Thus, while the designer is always in con ‡ict with the underdogs, he may be in agreement with the favorites. This suggests that there may be two con ‡ict types where the con ‡ict is either between the designer and both types of player or between the designer and underdogs. Part (a) of Proposition 6, indeed, points to these two con ‡ict types. Speci…cally, it suggests that the designer vs. players con ‡ict occurs when the cost asymmetry is below a certain threshold, and that the designer vs. underdog con ‡ict occurs when the cost asymmetry is above a certain threshold. Moreover, the threshold increases either as favorites are introduced or as underdogs are removed. Clearly, a greater threshold narrows the no-con ‡ict interval, the length of interval over which the designer and the favorites are in agreement on higher accuracy. Accordingly, adding a favorite and/or removing an underdog makes the consensus between the designer and the favorites more likely.
Part (b) of Proposition 6 highlights con ‡icts where the initial accuracy is very high.
In addition to the two con ‡ict types above, part (b) of proposition 6 points to an extra con ‡ict type which is observed when the cost asymmetry is intermediate. In this type, the con ‡ict arises between the designer who does not prefer higher accuracy and the favorites who do prefer. In the remaining two types, the designer always prefers higher accuracy as in part (a). However, the designer and the favorites reach a consensus on higher accuracy over an interval [e c(n; m); b c(n; m)] where e c(n; m); b c(n; m) < n n 1 . This is in stark contrast to part (a) where the favorites and the designer reach a consensus on accuracy improvement for signi…cantly high cost asymmetry (meaning that c > exp(1 + n 1 m )). However, it is not entirely clear, particularly compared to part (a), how the addition of either more favorites or more underdogs reduces the upper and lower bounds of the no-con ‡ict interval, which re ‡ects the possibility of con ‡ict since c = b c(n; m) e c(n; m). For example, consider the interval [a; b]. If both a and b decrease with the introduction of favorites and/or underdogs, then it is unclear exactly how the length of the b a interval changes, since it would depend on whether it is b or a that decreases at higher rate. In other words, both b c(n; m) and e c(n; m) decrease with the addition of new players, making the change ambiguous. In order to make it clear, we present the following numerical examples. Figure 4 , it points to non-monotonicity. Speci…cally, the no-con ‡ict interval …rst expands, then it shrinks with an addition of underdogs. Said di¤erently, while more underdogs in the contest make the adoption of higher accuracy more likely, this likelihood diminishes over time. To grasp the intuition, consider the extreme case where there are no underdogs, that is, the competition takes place among the favorites, i.e. homogeneous contest. As explained earlier, in such a case, higher accuracy is always preferred by the designer only not the favorites. In other words, the length of no-con ‡ict interval is 0. Addition of an underdog to the contest, however, leads to a non-zero interval length. Consider now the other extreme where there are in…nitely many underdogs.
Clearly, this contest can be considered as homogeneous as long as the number of favorites is …nite. Consequently, no-con ‡ict interval eventually vanishes.
Discussion
Our analysis features discrepancies in the preferences of players and designer for higher accuracy. While these discrepancies may not be important for contests where players'preferences do not matter for the design process, they are clearly crucial for others where they do matter. According to Dixon (2004) , most students choose letter grading over plus/minus grading despite the fact that the latter leads to greater grading accuracy than the former. Accordingly, we expect to see letter grading instead of plus/minus grading in schools whenever the players'preferences matter for the designer. The report of the Ad-Hoc Committee of Eastern Kentucky University revealed that those not using plus/minus grading cited student resistance as one factor. We conjecture that players'preferences are more likely to matter in settings where there are large and long-term players. The rationale behind our conjecture is multi-faceted.
Firstly, the design process can be democratic in that any proposal by the designer needs to be agreed upon by players. Secondly, when the contest designer is selected by the players, he may value their preferences to increase his re-election prospects.
Finally, large players may in ‡uence the designer's decision by various means such as lobbying or by pressuring him. In team sports such as soccer or baseball, for instance, competition takes place among long-term teams where some are disproportionately powerful. Yet, in individualistic sports such as tennis, golf, or athletics, the players are short-term and can not hold too much power. In line with this conjecture, our analysis predicts that team sports such as soccer or baseball are associated with less accuracy than individualistic sports. This prediction appears consistent with current practices in sports. In addition to the previous prediction that seems to correctly address the accuracy disparities across contests that di¤er in the signi…cance of players'preferences on design process, our analysis has another prediction about accuracy disparities across contests that di¤er in the level of heterogeneity. Specifically, our analysis predicts that greater heterogeneity is closely linked with higher accuracy whenever players'preferences matter for the designer. The evidence from European soccer leagues presented in the Introduction, seems to support this prediction. More speci…cally, the evidence shows that the soccer leagues of England and the Netherlands, the most heterogeneous ones, have recently decided to implement a goal-line technology while those of Germany and Spain delayed their decision until 2015. Though somewhat extreme, our limit results in Proposition 4, which states that the favorites support higher accuracy only under certain cases, seems to explain why top tennis players such as Roger Federer and Novak Djokovic have expressed 24 their opinion against the use of technology in tennis. 13 Apart from the above predictions, our analysis underlines several distinctions between two-player contests and contests with more than two players. First, while a change in accuracy alters players'e¤orts through direct e¤ect only in two-player contests, this happens with indirect e¤ect in addition to direct e¤ect in contests with more than two players. Second, in a more general case, the e¤ort-maximizing designer does not necessarily decrease the contest accuracy with an increase in heterogeneity.
More precisely, our analysis indicates that when there is more than one favorite, it is still optimal for the e¤ort-maximizing designer to increase contest accuracy for signi…cant heterogeneity levels.
Pairwise Contests and Accuracy
Up to now, we have assumed that all players compete simultaneously. However, in certain contests, competitions involve only two players. That is, while at the time of accuracy choice, players may not know their rivals. They know that there will be only one opponent. In this section, we demonstrate that our results above continue to hold.
Suppose there are once again, n favorites and m underdogs. Conditional on being a favorite, the opponent is a favorite with a probability n 1 m+n 1
, and an underdog with a probability m m+n 1 . Proposition 7 Suppose each contest involves only two players and opponents are drawn randomly. Moreover, the accuracy, r, is decided before there are n favorites and m underdogs where a given player will compete with his opponent which is to be drawn randomly. Then, (a) The underdog's payo¤ is decreasing in the accuracy, i.e.
(b) The favorite's payo¤ is ambiguous in the accuracy. Speci…cally,
: Proof. Let ij denote the payo¤ of type i in a pairwise contest when his opponent is of type j. Also let E[ i ] denote the expected payo¤ of type i. Since the opponent is chosen randomly,
Di¤erentiating with respect to r,
From the proof of Proposition 2, Proposition 6 con…rms that the accuracy choices of the players in pairwise contests are qualitatively the same as in simultaneous contests with many players. Regardless of the initial accuracy, the underdogs never prefer higher accuracy in both settings.
On the other hand, the favorites prefer higher accuracy if and only if either the initial accuracy is very low and the cost advantage is signi…cant, or the initial accuracy is very high and the cost advantage is moderate.
Concluding remarks
Contest accuracy, or the extent to which winning depends on the e¤ort rather than exogenous uncertainty, often varies across contests. While this variation may be expected among contests with di¤erent design objectives, it is rather a puzzle for those with exactly the same and /or relatively similar design objectives. Today, for instance, while some schools switched from letter grading to plus/minus grading to enhance grading accuracy, others continue to use letter grading. When asked, the latter points to student resistance among other factors. On the other hand, all sports are often designed with the common purpose of providing players with appropriate incentives to perform well. Yet, today only certain sports do use technology. A closer look reveals that they are mostly individualistic sports such as tennis, athletics, or horse-racing rather than team sports such as soccer or baseball. One notable distinction between them is that while the set of players often changes in individualistic sports, it remains the same in team sports. More importantly, the players hold less power in individualistic sports than in team sports. Our conjecture is that the contest designer takes the players'preferences more seriously in team sports compared individualistic sports. In the light of this conjecture, our analysis o¤ers one possible explanation for this puzzle by emphasizing the discrepancies in the preferences of players and the contest designer. Our analysis also o¤ers an explanation for the accuracy di¤erences across the same contests di¤ering only with regard to composition of the players. Speci…cally, our analysis predicts higher accuracy in less heterogeneous contests, which seems to be in line with the evidence in European soccer. One interesting …nding is that the favorites support higher accuracy only under certain cases. This seems to explain why top tennis players such as Roger Federer and Novak Djokovic have expressed their opinions against the use of technology in tennis.
14 Our analysis highlights several distinctions between two-player contests and more general contests that may be useful for future research. First, a change in accuracy alters players'e¤orts through an indirect e¤ect, or competitive e¤ect, which is absent in the two-player case. Second, in contrast to the two-player case, e¤ort maximization does not necessitate lowering contest accuracy for excessive cost asymmetry between types.
